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REVERTERS, RIGHTS OF ENTRY, AND EXECUTORY
INTERESTS: SEMANTIC CONFUSION AND THE

TYING UP OF LANDt
VERNTER F. CHAFFIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

REVERTERS, rights of entry and executory interests are commonly

used to tie up wealth and to enforce the desires of the transferor
as to its use in a specified manner or until the happening of a stated
event. Donor autonomy, if given free rein, would be detrimental to
the well-being of society. Especially where land is involved, the usual
private restriction is apt to do more harm than good. Not only is this
method of regulating land use obsolete and dangerously inefficient, but
the most economical use of the community's one basic resource is
impaired because such restrictions do not have the flexibility to meet
changing demands and conditions. The dictates of the transferor may
be used as a club to foredoom the land to remain undeveloped or to
limit it to an uneconomic use unless an extravagant price is paid for the
release of the restraint.'
What is equally objectionable (and more likely to occur) is that the
tying up imposed by a long departed donor cannot be released because
of the impossibility of determining the identity of all those who have
the right to enforce it. Such interests fractionate with the passage of
each generation until the determination of the heirs and successors of
the original transferor becomes an overwhelming, well-nigh impossible
task.' The impediment to marketability thus produced indirectly affects
the financial well-being and the tax structure of the community. The fact
t Portions of this article were included in a thesis submitted to Yale Univerzity in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the J.S.D. degree.
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law.
1. These themes are elaborated in Simes, Elimination of Stale Restrictions on the Ue
of Land, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, A.B.A., 4 (1954). See alzo
Committee on Improvement of Conveyancing and Recording Practices, Section of Real
Property, Probate and Trust Law, Report, A.B.A., 73, 76 n.10 (1957).
2. The problem of locating the holders of the various fractional share3 after ccveral
generations have passed on tends to cause the present owner not to undertake the task and
to resign himself to the restricted use long after sensible management would dictate a very
different use. For a recent decision which highlights the danger of creating a paoibility of
reverter in favor of a corporate grantor see Saletri v. Clark, 13 WMis. 2d 325, 103 N.W.2d
543 (1961). This case held that the dissolution of the corporate owner of the reverter still
left the defunct holder "sufficiently alive to be a repository of title," and that when the
determinable fee ended, the title passed to the erstwhile corporation in the same manner
as any other assets omitted from the final distribution. Id. at 331, 103 N.W.2d at 551.
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that the saleable value of the land is greatly reduced in turn lowers the
tax base of the community, and thereby causes the assessed valuation
of unrestricted land to be raised to obtain the needed public revenue.,
Most observers would agree that private tying-up arrangements should
be viewed with judicial disfavor, that they should be reluctantly enforced,
if at all, and where possible, eliminated altogether. Regardless of how
the restraint is established, e.g., by possibility of reverter, right of
entry, or executory limitation, the results of essentially identical techniques of creation should be the same. Legal doctrines aimed at like
degrees of restraint, although effectuated by different labels, should
receive consistent treatment. Numerous writers have cried out repeatedly
for a rational, uniform policy towards "dead-hand" control which ma)
not be evaded by phraseology or drafting techniques."
Both the traditionalist and the realist will find much that is unsatisfactory in the decisions rendered within the past few years dealing with
private restraints on land. The traditionalist will point with particular
dissatisfaction to cases where the distinguishing characteristics of dif.
ferent doctrines and concepts are treated with ignorance or indifference,
while in others the wrong term is applied, or even worse, mutually exclusive dogma is used interchangeably and synonymously with its
counterpart. The functionalist will regard with disfavor the line of
recent decisions in which form is exalted over substance to the extent
that allowable tying up is dependent upon the manner in which the gift
is phrased. He will look with equal disdain upon judicial preoccupation
with doctrinal distinctions, and the reliance on purely fortuitous factors
(such as the location of the gift in the instrument or whether two clauses
are used rather than one) which make it possible to avoid the policing
effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Both would agree, however, from their differing perspectives, that the
case authorities have been unfortunate, confused and haphazard, and
3. An excellent statement concerning the undesirability, from a policy standpoint, of
enforcing land use restrictions by forfeiture is contained in Leach & Logan, Cases on Future
Interests and Estate Planning 75 n.45 (1961).
4. A good deal has already been written on the inconsistent and confusing results that
are produced by the different doctrines traditionally associated with various future interests
which are functionally similar. See, e.g., Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders and Executory
Interests: A Requiem for the Distinction, 43 Minn. L. Rev. 13 (1958); Lynn & Ramser,
Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to Functional Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the
Woburn Church Revisited, 43 Iowa L. Rev. 36 (1957); Lynn & Van Doren, Applying the
Rule Against Perpetuities to Remainders and Executory Interests Orthodox Doctrine and
Modern Cases, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 436 (1960). Much of the contemporary interest in doctrinal similarities may be directly traced to the teachings and writings of McDougal. See
McDougal, Future Interests Restated: Tradition Versus Clarification and Reform, 55 Harv.
L. Rev. 1077 (1942).
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that there is little or no predictability as to result. A major purpose of
this article is to examne some of the decisions rendered within the past
few years and to evaluate the results in terms of orthodox doctrine and
policy.
II. THE BATTLE OF LABELS
The Rule Against Perpetuities is society's chief weapon to police and
regulate the extent of permissible tying up of wealth. It is through the
Rule that the community declares for whom, for what purposes, and
upon what events the attempt of the transferor to impose private
restrictions will be given effect.
Possibilities of reverter, rights of entry and executory interests are
frequently employed to effect a shift in the enjoyment of property
upon the happening of an event which might never occur. The problem
of labels arises from the doctrinal distinctions made in applying the
Rule to these interests. Despite persuasive argument that the functional
equivalence of these devices should be recognized' and that they should
be accorded comparable treatment, authoritative common-law doctrine
discriminates against the executory interest.
By definition, reverters and rights of entry are interests in favor of
the transferor or his estate; G an executory interest is in favor of some
third party transferee.7 The Rule has no application to the former, and
there are many American cases enforcing possibilities of reverter and
rights of entry even though unlimited in duration.8 But "no one has
ever doubted that executory interests . ..are within the rule . .

. .

S. Ibid.
6. Reverters involve the idea that a part of the ownership is retained by the donor !hmply
because it has not been given away. Gulliver, Cases on Future Interests 52 (1959). The
American Law Institute defines a possibility of reverter as "any reversionary interest which
is subject to a condition precedent." Restatement, Property § 154 (1936). A right of entry
traditionally refers to the power of the donor to reacquire the interest given on the
happening of a condition subsequent. Goldstein, Rights of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices To Restrict the Use of Land, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 243 (1940). See also Wath,
Conditional Estates and Covenants Running With the Land, 14 N.Y.UL. Rev. 162 (1937).
7. Simes & Smith, Future Interests § 221 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as Simes &
Smith].
3. 2 Powell, Real Property § 179 (1950); 5 id. § 769 (1962). In England, howevcr, both
the right of entry and the possibility of reverter have been held subject to the Rule. See,
e.g., In re Trustees of Hollis' Hosp. and Hague's Contract, [1299] 2 Ch. 540 (right of
entry); Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 83 Sol. J. 213 (1944), 62 L.Q. Rev. 222 (1946)
(possibility of reverter); Simes & Smith §§ 1233-39; 6 American Law of Property 9§24.9,
24.62 (Casner ed. 1952); Restatement, Property §§ 370, 372 (1944).
9. Simes & Smith § 1236. Historically, "the rule first developed in its modern form to
check the abuse of the executory interest." Ibid. 1 American Law, of Property §§ 1.32, 1.33,
4.32 (Casner ed. 1952); 6 id. § 24.20.

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31

One need, therefore, be concerned about violating the Rule Against
Perpetuities only if he is attempting to create a future interest in a
third party, rather than in the transferor or his estate.
Critics have aptly pointed out that the tying up afforded by reverters
and rights of entry is just as serious as that effected by the executory
interest, and that it is ridiculous to suggest that one verbal form
transgresses public policy but not the other. 10 Surely such differences in
result should not be made on the basis of differences in the identity
of the holder of the future interest.
Perhaps due in part to such criticism, a line of recent decisions has
in practical effect nullified the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to remote executory interests. For the competent draftsman, it is
an easy task to make a shifting gift to a third party transferee upon a
remote contingency. All that needs to be done is to insure that the
interest of the transferee is placed in a category that is unobjectionable
from a doctrinal standpoint. For example, if T devises to X Church
"so long as the premises are used for church purposes," then to A, the
attempted shift is void as a remote executory limitation and T's heirs
have a possibility of reverter. But if the gift to A is contained in a
subsequent clause of the will, it is effective, not as an executory limitation, but as a devise of T's possibility of reverter.11 The irony of the
situation is intensified when it is recalled that there are a number of
other drafting techniques by which the prohibited gift to A could have
been accomplished. 2
As a further illustration of the confusion inherent in technical legal
concepts, consider the following disposition: T devises to X Church "but
should the premises ever cease to be used for church purposes, then
10. The traditional doctrine is that executory interests do not have the capacity to

"vest in interest" before they become possessory. Restatement, Property § 370 (1944). Leach
and Tudor have strongly urged that "this ancient conceptual distinction should not be
significant in the application of the Rule against Perpetuities." 6 American Law of Property
§ 24.20, at 62 (Casner ed. 1952). See also Lynn & Ramser, Applying the Rule Against
Perpetuities to Functional Equivalents: Copps Chapel and the Woburn Church Revisited, 43
Iowa L. Rev. 36 (1957).
11. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922

(1950).
12. The following ways are illustrative: (a) "To X Church for 999 years so long as
the premises are used for church purposes, then to A and his heirs." A would have a valid
vested remainder after a term of years rather than an executory interest. Simes & Smith
§§ 103, 221; (b) Deed to X Church "so long as . . . etc.," and the transferor thereafter by
separate instrument assigns his possibility of reverter to A. Simes & Smith § 1860; (c) The
transferor, by exacting a promise from the transferee upon sufficient consideration could tie
up the land indefinitely, for the Rule applies only to property, not to contracts. Simes &
Smith § 1246.

19621

TYING UP OF LAND

I give said land to A." The will left the residuary estate to B. Depending
upon the label chosen, plausible technical arguments could be made
that the land, upon cessation of the specified user, should go to either
(1) A, (2) B, (3) T's heirs, or (4) remain in X Church. A will receive
the land if he successfully maintains that he was the devisee of the possibility of reverter which remained in T's estate after creation of the
determinable fee in the church. B will win if he convinces the court
that the church received a determinable fee, with an attempt to create an
executory devise in favor of A. This interest would violate the Rule,
thus leaving a possibility of reverter which would be passed under the
residuary clause to him. T's heirs would urge that the possibility of
reverter passed to them by intestacy, on the theory that the gift to A
and the gift to B were void executory devises and could not be given
effect. X Church would be entitled to retain the land if the will were
construed to give the church a fee simple (rather than a determinable
fee) subject to a void executory interest in A. The invalidity of A's gift
would thus leave an absolute, indefeasible estate in X Church."
Despite the excessive reliance on legal technicality, each of these
results finds some support in policy-type reasoning. Conceptually, there
is perhaps no reason why a possibility of reverter or a right of entry may
not be devised by the same instrument under which the preceding determinable fee was created. Moreover, a convincing argument could be
made that it is preferable to pass the interest to the selected objects of
the donor's bounty rather than send it by intestacy to his heirs. On the
other hand, a determination that the first devisee received an absolute
interest would be consistent with the policy favoring greater alienability
by the elimination of future interests which clog the title.
The major point of criticism is that the validity or invalidity of the
gift is made to turn on a label, and the label turns upon meaningless
and irrelevant technicalities. This absurdity may be demonstrated by
several recent cases dealing with void executory gifts.

II. TEE EFFE-CT OF A Vom ExEcuToRY INTEMST
What happens when there is a void executory interest depends upon
whether the preceding interest is classified as a fee simple or a determinable fee. If the present taker receives a fee simple, the failure of
the executory limitation simply leaves the preceding estate absolute and
indefeasible. 4 But if the first taker receives a determinable fee, there
13. Gray, Rule Against Perpetuities § 593 (4th ed. 1942); Restatement, Propzrty § 229
(1936).
14. Mc Iahon v. Consistory of St. Paul's Reformed Church, 196 Md. 125, 75 A.2d 122
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is a possibility of reverter remaining in the transferor despite the failure
of the executory interest.'" This interest will pass either under the residuary clause or by intestacy. The cases, for the most part, are in
confusion as to what language creates what interest, and the decisions
are based on inconsistent results reached by courts faced with essentially
the same problem.
An example of the judicial hostility towards forfeiture provisions and
a readiness to construe the preceding interest as an absolute one is
found in Edward John Noble Hosp. v. Board of Foreign Missions.1 In
1922, Lucy A. Turnbull conveyed a tract of land to a named hospital
" 'forever' " upon the condition that the grantee, its successors and
assigns " 'shall forever use the . . . property for hospital purposes
'" The deed further provided that "'any failure or neglect to
only ....

maintain a general public hospital shall work a complete and absolute
forfeiture . . . of the hereby granted property and estate and the same
shall thereupon revert and become part of the residuary estate... ' " of the

grantor. 1 7 Mrs. Turnbull's will, probated in 1928, left her residuary estate to three charities. In 1950, the premises ceased to be used for
hospital purposes, whereupon the residuary devisees sued to recover
the land from the hospital's successor in interest.
The court held that the 1922 deed created a fee simple rather than
a determinable fee in the hospital, to be cut short by an executory
interest in favor of the grantor's residuary estate. Since this shift in
enjoyment was upon a remote contingency, it was void and the
hospital retained an absolute fee which passed to its successor in interest.
By way of dictum the court commented on the language employed:
If the clause creating the fee simple in the hospital had included automatic words
of termination-for example, "so long as the property is used for hospital purposes
only" or "until the property ceases to be used for hospital purposes only"-thc
hospital would have received a fee simple determinable. In that event, when
hospital use ceased, the property would have automatically reverted to the grantor
However, the clause creating the fee simple in the hospital conor her estate ....
tained none of these characteristic words appropriate to the creation of a fee simple
determinable.' 8

Lucy A. Turnbull's desire to benefit the residuary takers under her
(1950); Proprietors of the Church in Brattle Square v. Grant, 69 Mass. (3 Gray) 142

(1855).
15. First Universalist Soc'y v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); Yarbrough
v. Yarbrough, 151 Tenn. 221, 269 S.W. 36 (1925) ; Restatement, Property § 228, comment b
(1936).
16. 13 Misc. 2d 918, 176 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
17. Id. at 919, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
18. Id. at 920-21, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
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will whenever the property ceased to be used for hospital purposes
could have been realized in several ways, however, i.e., (1) by malking
a gift to the hospital "so long as" rather than "forever" thereby retaining a possibility of reverter which would have passed into her
residuary estate for the benefit of the three charities; (2) by specifically
naming the three charities as holders of the executory interest rather
than providing that it go to the "residuary estate" (this would be valid,
for a charitable gift on a remote contingency is good if preceded by a
gift to charity);"' (3) by construing the language of "condition" as
creating a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent in the hospital.
The corresponding right of entry in the grantor would have been exempt
from the Rule, and, therefore, it could pass under the residuary clause
of the will.
Despite the frustration of Mrs. Turnbull's desires and the availability of alternative drafting techniques, the Noble Hosp. case was
correctly decided. Had the grantor intended to create a determinable fee,
it would have been very easy to have said so, or to have spelled it out
in a reverter clause. The word "forever" strongly suggests a fee simple
rather than a determinable fee. Recent decisions have been reluctant to
enlarge the determinable fee, and they have indicated a strong tendency
to construe the interest as a fee simple absolute whenever this is possible.2" It is accepted doctrine that a statement of purpose, without
more, does not qualify the estate, and, therefore, failure of the declared
purpose will not terminate the interest of the initial holder.
There are, however, several holdings which reach the opposite result
on virtually indistinguishable facts. This dubious line of authority suggests that the first taker of necessity receives a determinable fee, even
though no words of limitation or reverter are used, if followed by an
executory interest. A good example of this position is In re Pruncr's
Estate,' where the testator devised certain described realty "in trust
forever" for the establishment and support of a Home for Friendless
Children from two specified Pennsylvania boroughs. There was no
residuary clause, but a codicil to the will provided that "should there
exist any Reasons why the Borough of Tyrone and the Borough of
19. 5 Powell, Real Property § 763-70 (1962); 4 Scott, Trusts § 401.5 (2d cd. 1956);
Restatement (Second), Trusts § 401 (1959); Restatement, Property § 397 (1944).
20. Restatement, Property § 229 (1936) states a constructional preference for finding the
prior interest indefeasible in the absence of manifestation of a contrary intent. See, e.g.,
Rostell v. Arkansas & Ozarks Ry., 230 Ark. 515, 323 S.W.2d 539 (1959); D. C. Burns Realty
& Trust Co. v. City & County of Denver, 143 Colo. 430, 354 P.2d 150 (190
f;
Hill v.
Towson Realty, Inc., 221 Ald. 3S9, 157 A.2d 796 (1960); Mcahon v. Conitory of St.
Paul's Reformed Church, 196 Mld. 125, 75 A.2d 122 (1950).

21. 400 Pa. 629, 162 A.2d 626 (1960), 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 433 (1961).
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Bellefonte Cannot Carry out the provisions of this will . . . then the
Property that was bequeathed . . . for the purpose of a Home if such
becomes invalidated from any cause then said Real Estate-is bequeathed absolutely to my Niece Sallie M. Hayes ....
,22 The testator
died in 1904. The boroughs accepted the gift, established the Home and for
a number of years provided care for several children. Sallie died in 1933,
leaving a will which gave her residuary estate to her four children. Since
1949, there have been no children in the Home. The court, although not
quite sure what estates were created,2 3 held in substance that the
boroughs received a determinable fee, that the intended gift over to
Sallie was a void executory devise, and that the possibility of reverter
remained in the donor's estate and passed2 4 to his heirs by intestacy,
there being no residuary clause in the will.
In support of its reasoning that the failure of the purpose caused an
automatic termination of the estate in the first taker, the court stated:
When the Boroughs of Tyrone and Bellefonte could no longer carry out the provisions of testator's gift, their determinable interest ceased and terminated. When

the gift over to Sallie M. Hayes was invalidated because it violated the rule against
perpetuities, the real and personal property which testator gave . . . first to the
Boroughs and then to Sallie M. Hayes, revert back to the estate of the testator by

operation of law with the2 5same force and effect as if there had been no gift over...
and an intestacy results.

Here again, the will could easily have been drafted so that Sallie or
her heirs would have received the property by giving it to the boroughs
"so long as" the premises are used as a Home for Friendless Children;
then by devising the possibility of reverter by a subsequent clause to
Sallie. Or Sallie's interest would have been good under the language
used by the testator had the will made a gift of the residuary estate
to Sallie. This would have transferred the possibility of reverter to her.
22. Id. at 632, 162 A.2d at 628.
23. "Irrespective of the exact name of the interest or estate which testator gave to the
Home for Friendless Children, it is well settled that . . . if the purpose fails, the estate given
to the Home determines and is automatically terminated." Id. at 639, 162 A.2d at 632.

24. A similar result was reached in Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 448
(1950). In that case there was a conveyance of land for the benefit of an orphans home
and school, "'and when it ceases to be so used, or when said home and school shall be

moved from Batesville, Arkansas, said property shall revert to the heirs of the said

J. W.

Fletcher.'" Id. at 583, 227 S.W.2d at 449. The grantee foolishly conceded that It had but
a determinable fee, and disclaimed any further interest in the property after the specified

user ceased in 1948. If a determinable fee is created, it is clear that a possibility of reverter
remains in the transferor and that it will pass either under his will or by intestacy. The

concession of the grantee was a crucial and unnecessary one, in the absence of language
sufficient to create a special limitation. See 4 Baylor L. Rev. 246 (1952).

25. 400 Pa. at 640-41, 162 A.2d at 632-33.
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Under the court's view, the attempt to create an interest in her by
codicil made it an executory devise, but if done by the residuary clause,
presumptively it would have been valid. This is clearly a distinction
without a difference. Surely there is no reason why a subsequent codicil
could not serve to transfer a possibility of reverter.
The preferable solution, however, would follow the line of reasoning in
the Noble Hosp. case and hold that the boroughs took an absolute fee
(not a determinable fee) and that the failure of the executory interest
simply left an indefeasible fee in the boroughs. Cy pres could thus have
been applied to carry out the general charitable purpose.20 Such a
result is desirable in terms of both doctrine and policy. The only
qualifications imposed by the donor were (1) a statement of purpose and
(2) provision for a gift over. In the absence of language clearly creating
a determinable fee, the27courts should not manufacture one, for this
makes for inalienability.
Equally unsatisfactory is the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court
in Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Martin2s Testator's will devised land to
his son for life, then in trust with directions that the land be sold,
its proceeds invested in securities, and the income therefrom paid to
a named school district to maintain a course in vocational agriculture.
The will further provided that if the school district " 'shal fail for a
period of one school year to maintain a course in vocational agriculture
in said school, then this trust shall cease and terminate, and the principal
...shall be... paid to my heirs at law according to the laws of descent
and distribution of the State of Kansas.' "- The court held that the
school district received a fee simple determinable with a possibility of
reverter in favor of the testator's heirs. The reasoning was as follows:
By the terms of the will, the land in question was deAised . . . in trust subject
to a life estate, vdth the added provision that it was to go to W. Al. DeVore's heir
at law upon the happening of a certain event, which, in fact, might never happen.
Thus, the condition on which appellee's [the school district's] estate depended

was a condition subsequent and, therefore, appellee acquired a vested estate in trust
subject to defeasance.
The interest created in W. Al. DeVore's heirs at law was a possibility of reverter ... and as such is not subject to the rule against perpetuities.
26. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States (1950); 4 Scott, Truts § 399 (2d
ed. 1956); 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees §§ 431-36 (1953).
27. The Pruner case has been criticized for its "clouding of what was formerly clear
doctrine" and for its "disturbing effect" on the construction of wills. 1M9 U. Pa. L. Rev. 433,
436-37 (1961). The court violated the principle that a determinable fee does not arLe by
implication but must be expressed. Sparks, Future Interests, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 305 (1961).
23. 185 Kan. 116, 340 P.2d S99 (1959).
29. Id. at 117, 340 P.2d at 901.
30. Id. at 121-22, 340 P.2d at 904. (Emphasis added.)
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Both the traditionalist and the realist would agree that this decision
is wrong. The court's own discussion clearly indicates that the interest
in the heirs traditionally would be classified as an executory interest
on a remote contingency and void under the Rule Against Perpetuities.
The court admitted that it was a condition subsequent which defeated
the prior estate and cut it short. This was a fee on a fee, a gift to
charity, subject to a remote gift over to private individuals. The orthodox
result would hold the shift void and allow the first taker to retain an
absolute fee. There was no language used to show any intent to create
a determinable fee. Further, from a policy standpoint, the court showed
an undue readiness to place a label on the interest that would permit
the tying up of a fund.
An interesting case where purely fortuitous factors were used to.
determine that the estate was a right of entry rather than an executory
interest is Knowles v. South County Hosp.31 There a life estate was
devised to Earl Jacob Knowles provided that he reside on the farm at
least three months of each year, pay all taxes, insurance and repair
bills and" 'grow, or have grown, at least a peck of Indian maize, or Rhode
Island Jolnycake corn, on the ear.'" Upon Earl's death there was a
gift over of the farm to Earl's "'oldest male heir, under the foregoing
conditions, except Homestead Farm becomes his in fee simple upon his
fortieth (40th) birthday ....

'"

Concerning breach, it was provided that

" 'failure to comply with any of the foregoing terms, or neglect or inability to do so, will result in Homestead Farm becoming and remaining
part of my estate, whereupon it is to be bequeathed to the Rhode Island
State College ....

, ,32 The residue of the estate was left to three

named charities in equal shares. Upon Earl's failure to comply with the
terms of the gift (requiring that he reside on the premises a certain
number of months per year), the title was claimed by (1) Rhode Island
State College; (2) the three charities as residuary takers under the
will; and (3) Earl J. Knowles, the life tenant.
The court decided in favor of Rhode Island State College on the
theory that Earl had but a life estate subject to a condition subsequent,
with a right of entry in the testator's estate. This latter interest in turn
was given over to Rhode Island State College by a subsequent provision
in the will. In answer to the contention of the residuary beneficiaries
that the attempted gift over to Rhode Island State College was an
executory interest which was void under the Rule Against Perpetuities,
the court said:
31.
32.

87 R.I. 303, 140 A.2d 499 (1958).
Id. at 305-06, 140 A.2d at 500-01.
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If it were not for the testamentary language expressly providing for a reversion to

the testamentary estate in the event of a breach of the conditions it would be a
conditional limitation because it cuts down the preceding freehold estate before its
regular termination. As is well known such a limitation is not good at common law,
but under the statute of wills it is valid as an e_xecutory devise. It is always contingent and subject to the rule against perpetuities. 3

The court hastened to add that no executory interest was created

here but rather that the testamentary language was "equivalent to a
re-entry with all its consequences."134 And of course the important consequence is exemption of the latter, but not the former, from the operation of the Rule. The right of entry could be devised by a subsequent
clause of the will; but if the donor had provided, in the same clause of
the will which made the original devise to Earl, for a direct shift in enjoyunent to Rhode Island State College, such executory interest would
have fallen under the ban of the Rule.
The result turned on the insignificant circumstance that the testator
created what the court termed a right of entry to his estate and then
transmitted this by a later clause in the will to Rhode Island State
College. If a direct shift in enjoyment had been provided for it would
have been void, the title in the first takers absolute and, therefore,
readily marketable. What the court really did was to give effect to a
void executory interest by calling it a right of entry, and permitted it
to pass under the will to the college. For the knowledgeable draftsman
it is thus quite easy to evade the Rule by using two clauses instead of
one to make the gift.3"
Here again is the familiar battle of the doctrines, with the court free
to pick and choose at random. Had the court chosen to label the gift
to Rhode Island State College an executory interest and void, it would
be possible by manipulation of the variables involved, to have decided
in favor of any one of the other three claimants. The failure of the gift
33.

Id. at 3M9, 140 A.2d at 502.

34. Id. at 308, 140 A.2d at 502.
35. The Knowles case permitted the same thing to be done with the right of entry
that Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mfass. 645, 91 N.E.2d 922
(1950) allowed to be done with the possibility of reverter. "Since, unfortunately, the
possibility of reverter is not subject to the rule against perpetuities, this decdsion permits a

testator, by placing a gift in the residuary clause, to make it a possibility of reverter and
thus exempt it from the rule against perpetuities." Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities
Doomed?, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 179 n.4 (1953). The Knowles decision simply rcprezentcd an
extension of what Leach aptly calls the two-bites-at-the-cherry approach to rights of entry.
See Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev.
721, 741-43 (1952); Leach & Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities IS9 (1957); 6 American

Law of Property § 24.62 (Casner ed. 1952). The Woburn Church case is noted in 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 864 (1951).
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over could leave either an absolute, indefeasible title in Knowles and
his heir, or else by classifying their interests as determinable estates,
the testator's possibility of reverter could be passed under the residuary
gift to the three charities. A third possible solution would be to classify
both the gifts to the college and the gift of the residue as void executory
interests, and thus send the land by intestacy to the testator's heirs.
A final illustration is the Arkansas decision, McCrory School Dist.
v. Brogden.6 This case involved a conveyance of land to a school district
" 'for use as for a School (said property to revert to the heirs of the
Patterson Estate if discontinued as School property) . . . . '" The
habendum clause contained the phrase "'to have and to hold the same
...so long as this property is used for school purposes.' ,,aT The court
decided that this language created a determinable fee in the school
district, but that the gift over to the heirs of the transferor's estate
was void as a remote executory interest. This left a possibility of
reverter in the grantor which could be disposed of as he wished. After
reiterating the traditional differences between reverters and executory
interests, the court continued:
Therefore, the creation of the determinable fee was valid, but the gift over to the
heirs of the Patterson estate . . . constituted an executory interest and was void as

violative of the rule against perpetuities. Upon the occurrence of the condition set
out in the deed . . . Mrs. Patterson became entitled to possession. ....
.8

This entire line of decisions indicates a judicial propensity for wander-

ing and groping around in a doctrinal jungle. The shore is but dimly
perceived, if at all, in this hypnotic enchantment with labels and
semantic refinements. Although an occasional good result is reached,
it is by the smuggling in of policy through the backdoor prior to affixing
the classification. The method of approach and the majority of results
attained are a reproach to the legal profession.
IV.

LANGUAGE PATTERNS AND THE TRADITIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF

INTERESTS: SOME RECENT CASES

The confusion in terminology makes it possible for a court to decide
which legal consequences best conform to its current conception of
policy and equities, and then to construe the language so as to apply
the label that will produce that result. Several recent cases have exhibited
a cavalier disregard of doctrinal niceties where the latter would produce undesirable consequences.
36. 231 Ark. 664, 333 S.W.2d 246 (1960).
37. Id. at 667, 333 S.W.2d at 249.
38. Id. at 671, 333 S.W.2d at 251.
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An apparent deliberate mislabeling was sanctioned in Washington City
Bd. of Edz'c. v. Edgerton 9 A tract of land was conveyed in 1904 to
the school board "'upon condition that the same shall be held and
possessed . . . only so long as the said property shall be used for
school purposes.' ""o Thereafter a three-story brick school building was
erected on the premises and continuously used for school purposes until
1956. In that year, the building was sold and removed, and the land
was offered for sale by the school board. Although the verbal formula
"so long as" appropriate to the creation of a possibility of reverter was
used, the court ignored this factor and instead emphasized the absence
of any express provision for a right of entry. From this irrelevancy,
the conclusion was reached that the school board had a fee simple
absolute and could therefore dispose of the land as it wished. The court
reasoned as follows:
[W]e reach the conclusion that the language used in the habuidunt clause ... was
not intended to impose rigid restrictions upon the title or to create a condition
subsequent, but that it was intended by the parties thereby to indicate the motive
and purpose of the transfer of title. It expresses no power of termination or right
,of re-entry for condition broken.41
Two recent New Jersey decisions have held that even though an express provision for reverter is employed, a right of entry and not a
possibility of reverter is created if the purpose of the parties would
thereby be better served. In Oldfield v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 2 the deed
provided that " 'a failure to comply with the covenants and conditions
... will automatically cause title to all lands to revert to the City of
Ocean City .. . ,'4a The court held this explicit language was insufficient to create a possibility of reverter because the parties never
intended an automatic reversion. Other language was discovered which
was susceptible of being construed as a desire to create a condition
subsequent. In refusing to focus attention solely on particular forms of
expression, the court observed:
The ancient land law imputed a thaumaturgic quality to language.... If the judicial
eye in scanning the instrument chanced upon a pet phrase the inquiry was ended
without resorting to the arduous effort of reconciling evident inconsistencies therein.
The universal touchstone today is the intention of the parties to the instrument
44
creating the interest in land.

This philosophy of ignoring particular language when it would
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

244 N.C. 576, 94 S.E.2d 661 (1956).
Id. at 577, 94 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 578, 94 S.E.2d at 663. (Emphasis added.)
26 N.J. 246, 139 A.2d 291 (1958).
Id. at 251, 139 A.2d at 294.
Id. at 257, 139 A.2d at 297.
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frustrate the ultimate results desired was quickly followed in another
New Jersey case.4" A provision in the deed directed that title "shall revert" if the grantee fails to improve the property within a specified
period. This clear and positive language of reverter was held to create
a fee on condition subsequent and not a determinable fee.
A Virginia decision 46 furnishes yet another illustration that the socalled basic distinctions tend in practice to become so blurred that the
terms are used interchangeably. The conveyance contained an express
provision for reverter should the premises ever cease to be used for
railroad purposes. With disarming candor, the court made the following
observation:
Technically, perhaps, there is a distinction between a possibility of reverter and a
right of re-entry for breach of a condition subsequent; but the distinction is usually
and possibility of reverter and right of re-entry . . . are treated as the
not observed
47
same.
Following that heretical pronouncement, the opinion went on to talk

about the "breach of a condition subsequent upon which the possibility
of reverter depends," and said that the estate of the grantee continued
until entry. 48 Since the right of entry was now barred by the statute of
limitations, the result was an indefeasible fee simple in the transferee.
Throughout the cases there is a frequently reiterated policy that interests in the transferor which may result in forfeiture will be strictly
construed. What this means is that even though the courts may feel
forced to admit that a right of entry has been created, they seek to
avoid a finding that there has been a breach.40 A recent example of this
technique is Erskine v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb." The
donor's will devised a sizeable tract of land to the University of
Nebraska to be operated as an experimental farm, the income therefrom
to be used to provide scholarships in the College of Agriculture. There
was a gift over to certain named individuals in the event of the University's failure to observe the terms of the gift, which included several requirements designed to memorialize the testator's bounty. Plaintiffs
alleged a failure to comply, and asserted their claims as takers of the
gift over. The court held that the University had substantially complied
45. Alexander Bldg. Corp. v. Borough of Carteret, 31 N.J. 87, 155 A.2d 263 (1959).
46. Sanford v. Sims, 192 Va. 644, 66 S.E.2d 495 (1951).
47. Id. at 648, 66 S.E.2d at 497.
48. Id. at 649, 66 S.E.2d at 497.
49. Stewart v. Weaver, 264 Ala. 286, 87 So. 2d 548 (1956); see, e.g., Holbrook v. Board
of Educ., 300 S.W.2d 566 (Ky. 1957).
50. 170 Neb. 660, 104 N.W.2d 285 (1960).
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with the spirit of the gift, although perhaps not literally, and refused
to decree a forfeiture.
The result is unobjectionable, but it should be pointed out that the
University should have raised the perpetuities problem in addition to
its defense of substantial performance. The named takers in event of
breach had a shifting executory interest which was void for remoteness.
This would leave the absolute fee in the University since the divestment
could never take place even though a breach of the conditions of the
gift did occur.
Another method of handling a perpetuities problem is to ignore it or
simply state that it does not exist. In Illonawa Tribe No. 352 v. Wiley,
the Indiana court sidestepped an obviously void executory interest and
sustained the transfer without mentioning the Rule Against Perpetuities.
'This case involved a conveyance of land by the Mlonawa Tribe, with
the latter retaining the upper story of a building on the premises "so long
as" certain restrictions as to user were observed. In case of violation,
the Tribe's rights to the upper story "'shall cease and the use and
occupancy . . . shall revert to and become the absolute right and
property of the owners of the fee of said real estate.' ",
The rights which the Tribe retained for itself in the second story did
not neatly fit any of the conventional categories or definitions, and this
perplexed both the court and counsel. Rights of entry and possibilities of
reverter are, by definition, for the benefit of the grantor; but here the
restrictions were for the grantee's benefit. The fact that the parties were
reversed troubled the court. It was pointed out that the grantee cannot be
considered the grantor of the estate reserved and the "rules relating to the
reverter of estates to grantors has no application to the facts in this case
and proof of re-entry was unnecessary." 3
The hapless court finally worked its way out of this dilemma by
proclaiming that the grantee was the recipient of the fee subject to
certain rights in the second story which the Tribe reserved to itself as
long as the stipulated conditions were complied with. The retained interest of the Tribe was likened to a leasehold estate or to an easement or
license. Upon breach, the "right of user reserved by the grantor is
merely extinguished.15 Thus, the practical result was the same as though
a determinable fee had been created in the Tribe with a possibility of
reverter in its grantee.
The court's difficulty stemmed from the erroneous notion that the
51.
52.
53.
54.

127 Ind. App. 660, 142 N.E.2d 45S

Id. at 664-65, 142 N.E.2d at 490.
Id. at 670, 142 N.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 667, 142 N.E.2d at 491.

(1957).
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function of definitions and rules is to point definitely and precisely to
certain inevitable conclusions. The factors and policies which really
influenced the decision remained undisclosed for the most part or were
covertly brought in without explicit statement. It is a fact, however,
that judges frequently create and apply their own preferences as part
of their response. As an illustration, why could not the conveyance in
the Monawa Tribe case have been construed to give a fee simple determinable in the upper story to the Tribe, with an easement over means
of ingress and egress, subject to an executory interest in the grantee
void for remoteness? Even though the parties were reversed, surely
this is just as plausible a result from a doctrinal standpoint.
But under the circumstances there are reasons why it would not make
sense to invalidate an arrangement of this sort. The purpose of the
parties could have been accomplished by using two instruments, i.e.,
have the Tribe convey the entire premises in fee simple to the grantee,
then have the latter reconvey the second story to the Tribe "so long as"
or with a right of entry in case of breach. One may approve of the result
reached in the Monawa Tribe case but surely not the devious reasoning
by which it was achieved. The perpetuities problem was obviously there,
and it should have received explicit treatment by the court.
A closely related semantic problem arises when the transferor directs
that upon the cessation of use for a particular purpose the premises
are to "revert to the owner of the tract" from which it was originally
taken. A provision of this nature was involved in Donehue v. Nilges"
and in Jones v. Burns.5 The Donehue case arose out of a conveyance
in 1908 of a two-acre tract to a school district " 'so long as the aforesaid
premises shall be used for a school house site and no longer, and if the
aforesaid premises be no longer used for a school house site, then the
aforesaid premises shall revert to and become the property of the
grantors herein or those claiming title . . . by, through, or under said
grantors' "I'

What troubled the court was the language providing for a shift in
enjoyment to the grantors or their successors and assigns. After conceding that the school received a determinable fee, the court decided that
the limitation over was in substance a gift over to the then owners of
the balance of the tract. So regarded, it was a shifting executory interest
upon a remote contingency and, therefore, void. The possibility of
reverter thus remained in the grantor and passed to his heirs. When
the use for school purposes ceased in 1951, title to the tract vested
55. 364 Mo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553 (1954).
56. 221 Miss. 833, 74 So. 2d 866 (1954).
57. 364 Mo. at 708, 266 S.W.2d at 554.
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in the heirs and their successors rather than in the person who at that
time owned the adjoining land from which it was taken. s
On strict legal theory, this result is conceptually correct. Here was a
gift over that looked and acted like an executory interest on a remote
contingency to persons who might not be ascertained within the perpetuities period. Yet from society's standpoint, it would be far better to
uphold the attempted shift to the present owners of the tract rather than
to send it back to the grantor's heirs, who are likely to be numerous
and difficult to locate with the passage of time.P The possibility of
reverter will fractionate,"' whereas the attempted gift over will always
stay with the adjoining land, its holders can be more precisely determined
and releases be more readily obtained. From a functional standpoint, it
should be immaterial who succeeds to the enjoyment of the land
upon cessation of the intended use, i.e., whether it be the grantor, his
heirs, the owners of the adjoining tract or any other person.
The point is that the type of disposition in DoneIue v. Nilges0 ' offers
no threat to the policy of the Rule, and there is no reason why it should
not be effective. One method of doing this would be to hold that the
grantor's possibility of reverter was assigned by the language of the
deed itself to the person claiming title "by, through, or under" the
grantor. Since this could have been accomplished by a separate instrument
of transfer, there is no good reason why the deed itself should not be
regarded
as a shorthand method of effecting the assignment of this in62
terest.
A final example of judicial maneuvering to reach an acceptable result,
even though apparently contrary to established doctrine, is present in
several recent cases involving options to purchase retained by the
grantor. The orthodox rule is that such interests are subject to the
Rule Against Perpetuities and, therefore, void if capable of being exercised beyond the period. 3 However, by declaring the remote option to
53. A similar result was reached in Jones v. Burns, 221 Miss. S33, 74 So. 2d f56 (194).
After conveying a two-acre tract of land to school trustees on a determinable fee, the deed

provided that

" '

it is to revert to the owner'" of the adjoining tract from which it is tahen

upon cessation of the specified user. It was held that the shift in enjo cnt was an executory interest, void for remoteness, and that the possibility of reverter v.as inheritcd by the

heirs of the grantor.
59.

See Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3,

77 (1960).
60.

See note 2 supra.

61. 364 Mlo. 705, 266 S.W.2d 553.
62. This was the ground of decision in County School Bd. v. Dowel), 1910 Va. 676, 53
S.E.2d 3S (1950). See also Dvorak v. School Dist., 237 Iowa 442, 22 N.W.2d 233 (1946).
63.

Simes & Smith § 1244; Restatement, Property § 393 (1944).
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be a right of entry, the transaction becomes valid. In Byars v. Cherokee
County, 4 the court thus manipulated the labels to reach the result it
wanted:
The condition stated in the deed in this case, giving the grantor by the express
words used, the right to a reconveyance of the property should the appellant cease
to use the land for curing house purposes, is a condition subsequent, and upon the
happening of the event stated entitled the grantor to a reconveyance of the property. 65
Similar decisions were reached by an Alabama court in Dozier v.

7 In Dozier
Troy Drive-In-Theaters,Inc."0 and Rountree v. Richardson."

it was conceded that an option to repurchase, if unlimited in time, is
ordinarily void under the Rule. But the court hastened to explain why
this did not apply:
But if the stipulation by which the grantor is to have the privilege of a repurchase
on the occurrence of the condition named is a limitation on the fee to be conveyed, presently vested . . . such a limitation does not violate the rule against

perpetuities, for a conditional reservation presently vested is not subject to that rule
although exercisable on a contingency.08
This doubletalk and deliberate confusion of terminology was followed
in Rountree, with the meaningless statement that "a rule of property
has been created in this state which should be upheld."0 0 What really
mattered was the desire of the court to uphold commercial transactions
of this nature and permit the wishes of the parties to be carried out.
Viewed in that perspective, the decisions were wise, albeit doctrinally
suspect, for the Rule should not be allowed to strike down business arrangements where there is not the slightest threat of a family dynasty
70
involved.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since few instruments fall incontestably into one and only one
category, the traditional crutch of classifying interests as a prelude to
solution is an unreliable technique. The elaborate paraphernalia of
64. 237 S.C. 548, 118 S.E.2d 324 (1961).
65. Id. at 556, 118 S.E.2d at 328.
66. 265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956).
67. 268 Ala. 448, 108 So. 2d 152 (1959).
68. 265 Ala. at 104, 89 So. 2d at 546.
69. 268 Ala. at 453, 108 So. 2d at 156.
70. See Leach & Tudor, The Rule Against Perpetuities 220 (1957). Other escape devices
are to hold that the interest is a "contract" or a "mere covenant." See Gould v. Rite-Way
Oil & Inv. Co., 143 Colo. 65, 351 P.2d 849 (1960); Greco v. Meadow River Coal & Land
Co., 113 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1960). But cf. Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25, 90
S.E.2d 10 (1955) holding the grantor's right to repurchase void as an option and not a
provision for condition subsequent with a right of entry.
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doctrines and concepts with which the law of property surrounds itself
not infrequently produces the illusion of a seamless, logical consistency in
the decided cases. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. The fact
of the matter is that the asserted doctrinal distinctions are illusory, and
the various labels used more often represent an excuse for a decision
rather than a reason.
The courts have created a great deal of unnecessary difficulty and
confusion by not keeping authoritative doctrines and principles in their
proper subordinate position. The principal reason for this lies in the
failure of officials to understand and appreciate context and to compare
different techniques in a functional manner. This results in the problem
being viewed not as one of policy, but rather what verbalism to choose
from the competing array of concepts and principles. As has been
demonstrated, the skilled draftsman too often may, unmindful of
community preferences, route the court into one syntax rather than
another, or in one direction in a particular syntax rather than another
direction in that same syntax.
It obviously makes no sense to decide that a particular mode of tying
up is void, and yet permit other modes that are just as objectionable in
terms of the interest of society. What the American courts have failed to
realize is that every attempt to tie up a fee simple interest in land poses
a threat to the public interest by potentially immobilizing the one basic
resource of the community. In the highly developed industrialized
society of today, land use may be regulated most effectively, not by
"dead-hand" control, but by zoning, land use planning, urban redevelopment and similar public controls.
Undoubtedly, the insubstantiality of the distinguishing features of
reverters, rights of entry and executory interests should be recognized,
and uniformity of treatment accorded to these basically similar devices,
but more stringent restrictions are needed than the Rule Against Perpetuities would provide. Since contemporary land uses may change
greatly in the short span of a decade or so, it is irresponsible to permit
restraints which will endure for the full period of the Rule.
Judicial meanderings in the doctrinal thicket can most effectively be
dealt with by legislation limiting the duration of permissible restrictions
to a shorter time period. Although the ideal statute is yet to appear,
the recent wave of legislation has doubtless paved the way for more
adequate regulation. 7 ' Despite the political difficulty in getting intelli71. Mfasachusetts gave impetus to this movement in 1954 when it adopted a detailed
statute as part of its reform of the Rule. This legislation, vith some exceptions, set thirty

years as the permissible duration for reverters, rights of entry and interests limited to third
persons after a determinable fee. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 1S4A, §§ 1-6 (1955) (Supp. 19G1). For
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gent statutes of this kind on the books, a consistent increase in legislative
activity may be expected as the need for effective policing of these
unruly interests becomes better understood. Surely, the decisions within
the past decade have produced a stimulus in that direction.
an analysis of case law and statutes see Simes, Improvement of Conveyancing by Legislation
201-17 (1960). Recent Kentucky legislation has sought to abolish the purported doctrinal
distinctions between possibilities of reverter and rights of entry by converting the determinable fee into a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent. There is the further provision
setting a thirty-year time period within which the forfeiture contingency must occur. Ky.
Rev. Stat. §§ 381.215-.223 (1962). See Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law Restated
and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 3 (1960). New York, on the other hand, has set down the
requirement that such limitations must be recorded initially not less than twenty-seven years
and not more than thirty years after created, and a renewal declaration must thereafter be
recorded after the expiration of nine years and before the expiration of ten years. Otherwise such limitation becomes void and unenforceable. N.Y. Real Prop. Law §§ 345-49. For
statutes of other states whose purpose is to limit the duration of reverters, rights of entry,
and executory interests in land, see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 45-99 to -99 (1960); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 689.18 (Supp. 1961); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1958); S.D. Code
§ 51.16B (Supp. 1960).

